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I. Introduction
On February 2, 1990 President FW de Klerk shocked parliament by taking the first step
in dismantling the fifty-year old system of apartheid. He announced the unbanning of several
political parties including the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress
(PAC), and the release of all political prisoners. That morning he could hardly have realized the
momentum which the process would soon take, eventually leading to the first holistically
democratic elections by 1994.
In 1993, South Africa began the transformation process by passing the interim
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. It provided that a National Assembly be created the
following year, using a system of proportional representation (PR) with a closed party list to
choose individual representatives. While the system of PR was used in the 1999 elections, the
final 1996 Constitution required that a further process be created by legislation for elections in
the new millennium. Accordingly, the cabinet established the Electoral Task Team to study and
draft legislation for the future.
While operating with severe time constraints, the Task Team managed to publish a
thorough study on South African elections thus far, including extensive stakeholder interaction.
The report concluded that the electoral system had served the country well during the difficult
transition, continued to receive significant support, and should not be entirely overhauled. Most
individuals surveyed were generally satisfied with the fairness of the system, however expressed
a desire for more public debates, and for the election of national representatives with social and
political ties to an individual’s area. A majority of the team’s members agreed that increasing
accountability to constituencies in the electoral system was necessary, and drafted legislation to
reflect this. While the Task Team’s study was published in 2003, to date, the system has not been
changed to reflect the Team’s recommendations. Furthermore, the overwhelming presence of
corruption, especially in municipality governments, has led to increasingly severe criticisms of
the lack of accountability that officials have. Many of these problems can be identified by
examining the role of the party system that has developed in relation to the electoral system.
Proportional representation was implemented as the best way to create a stable society in
the face of the turmoil of transition. It was assumed that a diverse and vibrant multi-party system
would evolve to both include fringe groups in the new government, and reconcile the large
groups in society. While the system provided a peaceful transition- something that many thought
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would be impossible- the implementation of PR has not yielded a true multiparty system. This
thesis attempts to explain the emergence and maintenance of single party dominance as an effect
of the rules within the electoral system. These rules in turn interact with several informal
institutions that, in turn, mitigate the normal multiparty effects of PR.
The independent variable in this study is the electoral system of the country, which
includes all formal rules and practices used to translate votes into seats. While this thesis focuses
on PR, other systems are analyzed to place the study in a comparative context. To understand
single party dominance in this perspective, understanding the electoral system alone is not
enough. South Africa contains a set of distinct informal institutions that interact with the
independent variable to produce single party dominance, the dependent variable. Formal
institutions refer to de jura laws, systems, and regulations that have been put in place as or
through government structures. Informal institutions, on the other hand, are social, political, and
governmental changes that have occurred without changing written rules.
To make this comparative argument this thesis will begin with a discussion of electoral
systems in general, and explain the normal ways in which certain electoral systems produce
certain party systems. This background will make understanding the South African system
possible, as well as formal rules of the electoral system that are part of the independent variable
of PR. The third section reveals the informal institutions that are the crux of this thesis: society,
the tripartite alliance, the nature of the opposition, and the fluid evolution of government. The
interaction of these intervening variables on the system of PR is what causes single party
dominance. Before concluding, there will be a discussion of possible alternatives to the South
African system, and how changing the electoral system could diminish the effect of the
intervening variables.
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Independent Variable

Intervening Variables

Dependent Variable

Two-party system

Single member plurality
electoral system rules

Informal institutions
a.
b.
c.
d.

Society
Tripartite alliance
Nature of opposition
Fluid evolution of
government

Single party dominance

Proportional representation
electoral system rules
a.
b.
c.

PR
Closed list, super proportionality
Parliament, executive, federalism

Multiparty system
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II. Election System Overview
Introduction
The field of election study has grown enormously over the past few decades. The end of
World War II brought about an enormous push for democratic reform in Eastern Europe and
around the world, and with it an invigoration of studying what type of election system is best for
each country in its specific circumstance. Two trends have occurred: existing governments that
have reformed have experimented with new “mixed systems,” yielding a variety of revealing and
favorable results. Second, in the Third World especially, the viability of democratic governments
is often centered on engineering a correct type of election system. In these latter cases,
movement leaders, nations, and intellectuals come together to create and perfect an election
process to serve the diverse and specific interests of each country. By engineering institutions
that will provide a democratically elected government, they hope solve conflict in the short run,
and to normatively change the perceptions of the population towards rule by the people in the
long run.
A significant amount of literature explores what kinds of systems will yield what kinds of
results (Grofman 1986). For example, there is general agreement that a single member plurality
(SMP) will produce two parties, both attempting to appeal to the “median voter” (Sartori 1986:
55). When the electoral rules and government institutions are created, the hope is that a party
system and population favorable to democracy will occur. However, because the correlation
between election and party systems does not hold fast when applied across the gamut, it is
essential to understand in which circumstances the system would not produce a democratic
process in practice if we wish to succeed in this establishing democracy. This section will
demonstrate that (a) the election system alone cannot predict the type of party system that will
develop, even though it might good indicator in many cases, and (b) the process of a stable
election system alone cannot holistically produce the practice of liberal democracy, as is often
hoped.
Electoral Systems
Election systems are instruments used to “determine the means by which votes are
translated into seats in the process of electing politicians to office” (Farrell 2001:4). The main
types of election systems can be broken down into single member plurality (SMP), proportional
representation (PR), the single transferable vote (or alternative vote), and mixed systems that are
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in some way a conglomeration of these elements. The body of literature that describes each is
vast, as is theory of the party and government system that will result with these electoral systems.
However, the following section examines the large number of exceptions to general predictions
of each system. We must therefore look beyond the election system alone if new governments
are going to create formal institutions hoping that certain competitive party system with a check
on power will be created.
Single Member Plurality
Single member plurality (SMP), (also known as first-past-the-post,) is used to describe a
system in which the single winner is the candidate with one more vote than any other candidate,
or a plurality. The most distinguishing aspect of this approach is that the district magnitude
(defined as the number of candidates elected in each district) is always one, and therefore
extremely easy to understand and evaluate (Farrell 2001:20). The system can be called winner
take all because one more vote than the second candidate will ensure that only the candidate with
the most votes will be elected to the position. There are many criticisms of this system, generally
focusing on the losing candidate being denied complete access to influence the system (Reynolds
1995).
Party System

Because this paper attempts to explain the relationship between the

electoral system and the party system, it is essential to study what types of party systems result in
which types of electoral systems, in general. It is therefore generally agreed that the electoral
system can influence the party system. Giovanni Sartori takes the normative approach, arguing
that “the direct effect (influence) of electoral systems clearly is on the voter; but if they affect the
voter, it may be cogently assumed that electoral systems also, albeit indirectly and derivatively,
affect (shape) the party system as a whole” (1986:53). The effect of the electoral system on the
party system is more clearly described by “Duverger’s law,” named after the author who argued
that SMP makes it more difficult for smaller parties to win. Several authors attempt to explain
Duverger’s law further by arguing that voters know that a vote for a smaller third party is wasted,
taking an explicitly psychological position (Farrell 2001:162). Regardless of the effect on the
electorate, this law is one of the most concrete and often-cited laws of comparative electoral
politics. This means that the winner in a district takes all the power that the district has at the
representative level, and is the only individual representing the district. Therefore, smaller parties
without a real chance to win are grossly underrepresented in government (Farrell 2001:47).

WATT 7

General Consequences

While this may be defined as anti-democratic in process,

there are several elements that make this system apparently as democratic in practice. The
electorate knows who is responsible for what government action, and during elections can
choose between two “competing teams of policy makers, providing the winner with the
concentrated power to make public policy” (Powell 2000:233). Some argue that this
accountability is one of the most important parts of democracy because the government can be
held responsible for every decision taken under their administration (Farrell 2001:47). Generally,
SMP restricts the number of parties contending for office, facilitates single-party majority
governments, encourages large parties to compete for the support of the “median voter,” (the
moderate voter in the middle of the political spectrum,) and provides a greater incentive for
“strategic voting,” (voting beyond ones immediate preference to gain desired results) (Weaver
2002:112-3). Lastly, this system enforces a strong relationship between the constituency and its
elected representative (Farrell 2001:67).
Regionalism exception

As we can see, there are many general consequences or

predictions we can make about the types of party systems SMP will result. However, there are
enough examples of these systems when predictions do not hold true, and it is necessary to look
beyond the electoral system to ascertain what elements effected the skewing of the predicted
party system. There are notable exceptions to Duverger’s law, most prominently Canada and
India, who have SMP electoral systems combined with party systems with three or more
significant parties. William Riker modifies the law by presenting an exception when third parties
nationally are one of two parties in at least some districts (1986:31). That is, the two parties
fighting for a seat in a district might be the strongest two in that region, but not nationally. This
exception is important to note as it can lead to extreme exclusion of minority groups from the
national government (as in Northern Ireland before the imposition of direct English government
(Weaver 2002:112). However, specific national circumstances will dictate how severe and
problematic the level of exclusion will be (125). Therefore, we must look outside the purely
institutional mechanisms of SMP to evaluate how specific situations or informal institutions will
effect the elected government.
Proportional Representation
About half of the world’s democracies use proportional representation, in one form or
another (Farrell 2001:68). In such systems, voters usually cast their vote for a party rather than
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an individual. Seats are then allocated to members of the party at some proportion to the number
of votes cast, with candidates taken from pre-ordained lists. A “closed list” system refers to when
this list of candidates is created solely by a party’s internal mechanisms; that is the voters have
no extra-party say in the candidate selection. Andrew Reynolds argues that “national, and
unalterable, candidate lists allowed parties to present ethnically heterogeneous groups of
candidates which, it was hoped, would have cross-cutting appeal” (83). That is, the inclusion of
women and minority groups is much easier as candidates can be scattered throughout the list
with more traditional candidates. The biggest drawback to this system is that candidates lose
their personal connection with their constituencies, creating a national government that is further
from the people. Open lists, on the other hand, give voters the choice for a party or a candidate
by allowing the electorate to choose which individuals appear on the ballot (83). The
mechanisms of proportional representation become more complex when deciding how votes will
be translated into seats.
There are several methods used to translate the proportion of votes a party receives at the
polls into the proportion of seats they will receive in the legislature. While some (Sartori 1986)
say the method chosen to equate votes to seat is less important than other factors, others (Katz
1997) concentrate heavily on the formula used (Farrell 2001:154). For example the “Hare” quota
is argued to give more proportional results, whereas the “d’Hondt highest average” with the
“least remainder” is argued by many to have the least proportional results (Lijphart 1986:171;
Farrell 2001:155). Basic electoral rules can drastically change the foundation and form of
government. Others authors, however, deemphasize the importance of the formula used, focusing
instead on the manor in which candidates are elected, that is the use national or provincial lists,
or district magnitude, examining the number of individuals given seats in each district
(Taagepera and Shugart 1989:112; Farrell 2001:154). In sum, PR is far more complex because of
the high number of different variables, and the enormous disagreement over what variables are
most important to emphasize.
Party System Even with the enormous number of variables available to scholars of PR,
there is an easily apparent trend in the type of party system that results. In most cases, PR leads
to a competitive multi-party system that includes an array of perspectives from society (Farrell
2001:162). This is especially beneficial for new democracies which want to ensure all voices,
especially those on the fringes, do not feel as if they are shut out of the system and resort to
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violence (Reynolds 1996:90). PR also gives more power to party elites who, rather than the
electorate, decide which specific candidates will hold the elected position. This allows
individuals to be part of government who would not normally be chosen by a biased electorate.
Bingham Powell describes PR as choosing “political agents to represent their diverse views
continuously in post-election bargaining that will influence policy making” (2000:137). This
view implicitly emphasizes the primacy of the party in PR electoral systems, a relationship that
whose importance will become apparent in this study.
Other Systems
Mixed

With SMP and PR as extremes, there is a trend towards mixed electoral

systems that combine the proportionality of PR with the strong voter-representative constituency
relationship of SMP (Farrell 20001:97). There are interesting cases of such systems in several
countries, for example the German system incorporates the proportionality of PR while
simultaneously preserving a representative’s closeness with his constituency through SMP by
using a bicameral legislature (99-120). The benefits of such systems are obvious, however the
type of party system that would result from such an arrangement is more difficult to predict with
so many variables in the electoral system.
STV

The last general type of election system can be called the “single

transferable vote” (STV). While popular with scholars, this is used in very limited cases such as
Northern Ireland, and parts of Australia (Farrell 2001:123). This type requires that district
magnitude be greater than one, as the electorate cast votes for as many or few candidates as they
want, usually by number ranking their choices (127). Sinnott (1995) points out that while the
mechanisms of this system are complex, they reveal much about the links between parties and
candidate by studying voters and order preferences (Farrell 2001:137). Even though some
(Blondel 1969) argue that it has many advantages over both SMP and PR, the limited use of the
electoral system makes it difficult to study (Farrell 2001:155).
Stability

With the many options available to election engineers, it becomes

clear that the debate over which system works best is lengthy, often self-interested, and depends
greatly on national circumstance. It is essential to understand that the debate over the party
system is not the only variable that authors study when evaluating electoral systems. The
practical utility of an electoral system, as well as the degree to which it promotes democracy,
must be examined. The most prominent debate is the trade-off between proportionality and
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stability. That is, it is generally agreed that the more proportional a system is, the less stable it is
(Farrell 2001:20). On the surface, PR might seem more democratic because both the winners and
losers are represented in government. However, Beer (1998) argues that a truly democratic
government “must not only represent, it must also govern (Farrell 2001:193). Those who argue
that PR produces unstable government cite unstable government coalitions, or the antidemocratic principle of parties’ negotiation in coalition building without the say of the people
(Farrell 2001:193,196). Along these lines, PR does not offer a clear “forward-looking mandate”
while at the polls (Powell 2000:234). It can be argued that PR allows the voices of extreme even
anti-system parties to gain control, the most striking example is the rise Weimar Germany
(Farrell 2001:199).
Proponents of PR argue that instability is not caused by the electoral system. Some argue
that authors often incorrectly equate longevity of SMP systems to stability, and that PR systems
have shorter government reign, but are not necessarily less democratically stable (Farrell
2001:29-30). Farrell argues that there is in fact greater stability if the method used to translate
votes into seats is highly proportional; Arendt Lijphart points to the fact that governments
created by PR have superior records with macro-economic management (Farrell 2001:204). It is
essential to understand that the electoral system debate is vast, but that this thesis does not make
judgments on the utility of the party system, but rather its causes.
System Reform

It is worth mentioning another area of debate in the election field,

that of who controls system design, implementation, or reform. Authors in this subfield explore
what causes a certain electoral system to be implemented in a specific scenario (Farrell
2001:175). For example the system could be a “product of particular national circumstances,” or
cynically, based on “the whims of particular actors” (176). Arendt Lijphart argues that in most
cases the elite imposes system on passive voters (183). Grumm (1958) actually reverses the
causation, arguing that multi-party transitions or reforms will produce PR electoral systems, not
the other way around (Riker 1986:27). This becomes important when examining the normative
effects of electoral systems on populations with limited exposure to democracy.
Conclusion

The different types of electoral systems produce an array of party

systems and related systemic consequences. While there is a general prediction of these results in
the literature, the above review has made it clear that an array of extenuating circumstances can
disrupt the seemingly straightforward culminations of electoral systems. To be sure, the new
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South African electoral system is a prominent example of a PR electoral system that does not
result a competitive multiparty system based on coalitions and post-election negotiation.
With a preponderance of evidence and study on PR systems and their reflecting party
systems in general, the question becomes: why does South Africa not have the predicted
competitive party system? To understand this, one must explore the relationship between the
formal institutions of the electoral system, such as electoral rules and government structure, and
the informal institutions of the South African case that challenge general predictions.
South Africa Background
Context of Transition

On February 2nd 1990 President Frederik Willem de Klerk

stood in front of the National Assembly to announce what would become the beginning of the
end of apartheid. After 42 years in power, the ruling National Party unbanned opposition groups
such as the ANC and the PAC, and began to release political prisoners. First and foremost among
these was Nelson Mandela, who had led the opposition symbolically since his 1962
imprisonment. For the next four years de Klerk and Mandela grappled with the intense transition
process. In the face of extreme personal tension, the leaders faced an array of political and social
challenges before them that only the creation correct institutions could stabilize. Challenges,
issues that prevented agreement, included regional integration of the white-dominated Western
Cape and the quasi-autonomous Zulu homeland dominated by the controversial Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a sharp rise in both political and non-political violence among the
population in the early 1990s, reigning in violent wings of the Afrikaner right, such as General
Constand Viljoen, and the ANC left, land redistribution, intimidation of ANC opposition, the
effect of white business in politics, an institution to deal with justice of political atrocities on
both sides, the effects of “Bantu” education, and much more (De Klerk 1999; Mandela 1995).
This background is important to realize the diversity and intensity of the challenges leaders
faced, and why the electoral institutions that created the first majority government were chosen.
Formal Electoral System

In 1994 the country elected a transitional

government whose purpose was to write the paramount 1996 Constitution. The resulting
document called for a bi-cameral legislature made up of the National Assembly and the National
Council of Provinces (NCOP). Members of these bodies receive seats “in terms of an electoral
system that… results, in general, in proportional representation… [and] An Act of Parliament
must provide a formula for determining the number of members of the National Assembly”
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(South African Constitution). Subsequent transitional government legislation chose a highly
proportional system of PR to elect 400 members to the National Assembly- 200 from national
closed party lists, and 200 chosen from provincial closed lists. Members sit for a five year
period, and elect a powerful President who has full power to appoint his own cabinet (Butler
2004:105). The nine provinces and several “unicities” (independent large city governments) elect
their own legislatures simultaneously. In 2002 floor-crossing legislation was introduced to allow
members of the National Assembly to change party affiliation at specific intervals in between
election cycles (Butler 2004:105-6).
While this describes the formal institutions of the electoral system, there are several
trends or informal institutions that have influenced the transcription of the de facto electoral
system into a fluid party system. It is these formal institutions that lay the comparative
groundwork for the paper. To understand the utility of analyzing the South African electoral and
party systems, we must fit the country into a larger understanding.
Comparative Context
To start, we need to make it clear that comparative politics can be used to explain South
Africa’s system, and why Africa, in general, can aid our understanding of politics enormously.
Staphen Lindberg summarizes this debate in the comparative literature while arguing that stable
party systems in Africa result in higher levels of democracy (2007:219-221). He agrees with
Manning and Hayden (2005) that studying party systems in Africa study leads to “conceptual
stretching” because they are in their nascent stages (Staphen 2007:219). He criticizes Mozaffar
and Scarrit’s “The Puzzle of African Party Systems” (2005) because they compare institutions
across countries that have extremely varied levels of democratization. While he makes these
arguments, he creates a qualitative process that allows certain regimes to be studied
comparatively. South Africa falls in this “stable” category because the system has
“configurations with relatively deep roots in society because of civil war, societal mobilization or
ideological orientation” (236). If we are to use Africa, we must create high standards of
comparison and rigidity. This was done in the preceding sections that discussed the types of
electoral systems in general.
This point is essential as this paper attempts to compare formal rules and institutions and
their interaction with informal institutions. “With over forty relatively similar political systems
conducting regular multiparty elections, Africa offers an ideal terrain for comparative analysis of
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the role of political parties and party systems” (Walle 2003: 398). Even Guemerio O’Donnell
argues that the rules being followed are much more important than “parchment” institutions
(Bratton 2007:2). Taken together, Africa provides an array of systems that will become
enormously helpful when attempting to solve social problems with electoral institutions, and
their predicted effects on society. Holistically, an extensive study of election systems and party
systems is the first step in allowing us to effectively solve the problems of deeply divided
societies and mitigate explosive ethnic conflict (Piombo 2005:447-8; Bogaards 2004:174). It is
this first step that is examined in this thesis.
South African System and Society
Institutions Matter

In the South African case, comparative politics that focuses

on institutions will demonstrate how a society on the verge of explosion was able to use formal
institutions to water the fire. South Africa presents a special case only in that society interacts
with the formal institutions in very distinct ways. An important aspect of this relationship is that
the landscape at the party system level is dictated not only by the overwhelming majority of the
ANC during elections, but also by the way the electoral rules shape both the system and society.
Gretchen Bauer argues that it is not only society that is important in creating competitive party
systems, but institutions perhaps have the biggest impact (2001). Some authors argue that we can
understand ANC political dominance because of the “parochial” political culture, that the
liberation movement is in power only because the vast majority of the population votes for the
party (Lindberg 2006:12). However, saying that because people vote for the ANC purely on the
basis of a culture, and this alone dictates the party system ignores the primacy of institutions in
shaping the political landscape. First, in the hypothetical cases of different electoral systems,
there are some that would not leave the ANC dominant at the party-system level, even if two
thirds of society voted for them. For example, Ardent Lijphart’s consociationalism ensures that
minorities receive an equal share of national government with veto power, regardless of the vote
within the legislature (1985). Giovanni Sartori, a prominent writer on the effects of electoral and
party systems on government, differentiates between “constraining” and “unconstraining”
electoral systems (1986:54). That is, the electoral system can have a direct effect on the way that
the electorate votes and party systems are formed; or on the other hand, the electorate could vote
the same way under any system, and the results of the party system would remain the same. This
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makes the institutions that translate votes at the election system level into power at the party
system level, paramount.
A Normative System

Second, electoral systems do not only reflect the wishes of

the people, but often have normative effects on the way that people vote. In South Africa, over
the long run, extended exposure to democratic institutions, such as the electoral system, will
affect the way the electorate internalizes democratic values (Lindberg 2006). The way that
institutions affect popular views of democracy are important, especially as the failure of political
culture has caused the failure of democracy in other African countries (Melber 2001:25) This can
be explained because “popular support for democracy tends to drift downward over time… [but]
can be refreshed by alternations in power by way of elections” and help to “re-legitimize
democracy” (Bratton 2004:147). Trends throughout Africa show that people are dissatisfied
when the incumbent wins repeatedly, so much so that “the father back in the past an electoral
alternation… had occurred, the more disillusioned people were with democracy” (155). This
observation holds true in South Africa specifically. In 2002 the Institute for Democracy in South
Africa (IDASA) released studies indicating that trust for democratic institutions such as the
president, parliament, provincial governments, and the courts were at dangerously low levels.
This apathy for the system and disillusionment with the government may deteriorate until the
ANC is elected “by a growing proportion of a radically shrinking electorate” (Butler 2004:107).
This evaluation demonstrates the need for electoral institutions that will normatively instill
democratic values to ensure the peace and longevity of South African society.
This study of the effect of the electoral system on the party system is important because
in the long term, if the system as a whole is not viewed as democratic, the system will not
effectively normalize democracy in the hearts and minds of the electorate, and may continue the
slide from single party dominance towards single party authoritarianism. The importance of
finding the causes of single party dominance is central and paramount.
Formal Institutions of the Electoral System
Introduction

Now that this study has been placed into the comparative context,

we move to what makes the formal rules and institutions of the South African system different
than other systems. The general argument in comparative politics is that formal rules of PR
should produce a multi-party system. While there are some distinctions in the type of PR that
South Africa uses, they do not explain ANC single party dominance independently. This section
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argues that there are two aspects of the South African electoral system that are distinct, but if
applied to a hypothetical test country independently, would not cause ANC single party
dominance. First, the closed list system that is used to choose candidates, and second the
extremely proportional nature of the formula used to translate votes into seats. These formal
institutions are aspects of the electoral system that constitute the independent variable, and are
vital to understand why the intervening variables of informal institutions are mandatory to
explain single party dominance in the South African case.
Closed List
The first important and distinct feature of the South African system is the closed list
ballot structure. The electorate has no extra-party mechanism for which to choose candidates.
The most immediate problem this raises is that elected officials are not held accountable to the
electorate, but rather the centralized party. The problems of the constituency relationship are
dangerous in the long run because the system gives a significantly decreased incentive for
participation (Mattes 2002:33). As the perceived link between a voter and his constituency
grows, the less likely he is to vote, and the more apathy he feels for national government. South
Africa in fact has the lowest degree of citizen-parliament contact, at 0.2 percent, compared to
Namibia (also PR electoral system) at 1.0 percent, and several countries with SMP electoral
systems including Zambia (7 percent), and Lesotho (5 percent) (measured by survey asking
about perceived constituency-representative contact) (Mattes 2002:33). While these numbers are
estimated values of imperial data, they demonstrate that the direct link between the government
and the electorate in South Africa is low. Theses problems with the closed list system have not
gone unnoticed by many in South Africa. The National Assembly commissioned The
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) Electoral Task Team to release a report on the utility
of electoral system since transition. They suggested increasing the number of multi-member
districts, while decreasing district magnitude to elect 300 National Assembly members, while
retaining the closed national list for 100 members to preserve proportionality. It is suggested that
these changes would mitigate the distance between the government and its constituency.
Floor-Crossing

Related to the closed list system is the formal rule of floor-

crossing that was introduced in 2002, and allows one member of parliament to leave his political
party to join another permanently (“South Africa” AEC). Voting with or joining another party
for which a member was not elected is especially controversial because of the mechanisms of
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closed list PR- that is the electorate votes for a party, not an individual. Before 2002 legislation,
the South African Constitution (1996) contained an Anti-Defection Clause that disallowed
changing parties. However problems arose when the New National Party (NNP), the remnants of
the ruling party during Apartheid, wanted to split from the Democratic Alliance (DA), the
strongest current opposition, half-way through their elected term. While NNP members had
campaigned and were elected on the DA ticket, they were unable to change allegiance once in
their national and regional legislatures.
The introduction of this legislation now allows members to change parties twice during
each five-year term, at intervals selected by the president and party leaders (“South Africa”
AEC). While the legislation was initiated to solve problems between opposition parties and was
supported in the National Assembly by 86 percent of the voting members, the actual results have
benefited the ANC more than any other party (Mbeki 2006). [SEE APPENDIX 2] While a ten
percent threshold was set as the maximum number of defectors from each party, the ANC
immediately gained a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly following the first floorcrossing time period. While Matlosa and Shale (2006) argue that “floor-crossing” itself is not
anti-democratic, it becomes dangerous for democratic consolidation when introduced to less
developed party system (Masemolda 2007). Their argument is realized by the fact that the ANC
gained a non-elected super-majority, enough to independently alter the Constitution. The effects
of the closed list system and the implications of floor-crossing will become apparent when
compared to the informal institutions of the South African System.
Extreme Proportionality
Arendt Lijphart, the premier scholar in comparative electoral politics, argues that extreme
proportionality is the most distinguishing aspect of the South African electoral system (1995). It
is a result of the electoral formula used, the district magnitude, the electoral threshold, and the
size of the legislatures. Specifically, the entire country is one district, there is no electoral
threshold whatsoever, and the National Assembly is particularly large compared to other
governments that use PR. Some observers argue that PR leads to a system with too many small
parties. While South Africa avoided this problem with only seven parties being elected in 1994,
the ANC’s dominance immediately challenges the utility of multi-partyism. Extreme
proportionality with a number of small parties leads to increased power for the dominant power
(Rimanelli 2000). For opposition parties, this leads to a “dis-empowering” electoral situation that
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works “against the development of vibrant and stable multi-party electoral democracy” (Olaleye
2003:2). Taken together, it is obvious that extreme proportionality can be detrimental to the
strength of a viable opposition in South Africa. Extreme proportionality becomes important
when understanding the role of the opposition with informal institutions.
Institutional Dominance
The final critical aspect of the South African system that does not by itself cause single
party dominance, but is important when understanding the effects of the intervening variables, is
the arrangement of the government. Specifically, the power of the executive in relation to the rest
of government, and then the federal relationship of the system are important.
Presidency

The relationship between the presidency and the legislature is fluid, and

still being developed. Institutionally, the presidency is responsible for executing laws, and
contains the Cabinet, the Presidency, the Directors General, the Treasury, and security
enforcement (Butler 2004:93). The Cabinet members are appointed directly by the president, and
control over a million public servants. The vast power of appointment that the president has
gives him “a huge realm of patronage running into thousands” (94). Furthermore, he is close
enough to Government Communications and Information Service that he is easily capable of
manipulating the media (94). Institutionally, his powers are checked by the legislature. However,
“parliament is a bloated and largely reactive policy-influencing legislature on the Westminster
model, but with strict party discipline reinforced by a party-list proportional system” (118). That
is, it is the nature of the electoral system that disrupts the formal balance between the check that
the parliament has on the presidency. Members of parliament are responsible to the tight party
hierarchy rather than the electorate, or a local constituency. Therefore, the impetus to introduce
legislation in parliament is minimal, and usually initiated by the president himself.
Federalism

The constitution calls for a relatively federal system of government with

nine provinces, and local governments and municipalities at the bottom. Sub-national entities are
designed to help mitigate the legacies of apartheid. With regionally-based solutions, violence and
dissolution from a dominating national government was minimized. The provinces would help
implement general policies decided at the national level, tailored to the needs of specific
provinces. While a majority of spending occurs at the provincial government, its allocation is
strictly dictated by the national government (Piombo 2005:455). The municipal level, including
many unicities, is experiencing an increase in the autonomous control of their budgets and social
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spending. Many of the councils are elected by locals, and respond to local demands. They
represent the closest connection with people and the government (Butler 2004:104). The
importance of these formal institutions for explaining single party dominance become clear when
met with the informal institutions of the South African system.
Conclusion
This section has placed South Africa into the context of comparative politics. It has
included an examination of the formal electoral and party institutions in general, and in the South
African case. A comparison of general party systems to South Africa’s demonstrates that the
general rules of PR do not dictate or predict single party dominance alone. After an examination
of several formal institutions, or electoral rules and government structures, that are distinct in
South Africa, it remains unclear how these formal institutions affect the party system holistically
in South Africa. While some formal institutions matter- the closed list system, the high degree of
proportionality, and the arrangement of the government- they do not in themselves explain the
South African party system of single party dominance. However, we now move to explore what
happens when these formal institutions meet the informal institutions of South Africa over the
past fifteen years. As Goran Hyden puts it, “Africa is the best starting point for exploring the role
of informal institutions” (2006:6). In general comparative politics, these will demonstrate the
need to study informal institutions that interact with the formal institutions to produce a different
result: in this case the party system that causes ANC dominance.
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III. Intervening Variables – Informal Institutions
Section II described the formal institutions of electoral systems in general, and then in the
South African context. This section introduces informal institutions that are essential to our
understanding of the party system that exists today. While no clear division of these institutions
is perfect, this thesis will describe how society, the tripartite alliance, the nature of the
opposition, and the fluid evolution of government all work together to influence the formal
institutions of the country. Together, these explain why single party dominance results in the
South African system, and how it contributes to, rather than destroys, the comparative
understanding of electoral system – party system politics. To be clear however, the electoral
system remains our independent variable. The formal institutions of PR are required for the
informal institutions to produce single party dominance. If a SMP electoral system were
introduced, the resulting party system could not be explained through the same dynamic of
informal institutions.
Society
The first informal institution that is essential to understand single party dominance is the
manner in which parties are tied to society. Nicholas Van de Walle argues that one of the most
important problems with Africa is that political parties have weak ties to society, especially
compared to Europe and Latin America whose parties have historically based membership based
on class (2003:300). This feature leads many authors to the conclusion that “at the heart of the
contemporary crisis in sub-Saharan Africa lies a deep estrangement between state and society”
(Bratton 1994:231). South Africa is indicative of this problem. However some authors argue that
using the comparative viewpoint as an attempt to study party roots in society is problematic on
the African continent. There has been little work and analysis on the origins of political parties in
Africa, and how they tie to classes or deep-rooted ideology (Lindberg 2007:240). This is
problematic when examining the extent to which prominent authors that study other areas of the
world focus on class society. Seymour Lipset, a prominent author of comparative politics
focusing on Latin America, argues that party support is dependent on becoming linked with
“deep-rooted sources of cleavage, as parties in the older, institutionalized Western democracies
have been” (2000). When placing South Africa in comparative party – society politics, it
becomes clear that these ties are necessary to understand democracy, and we do not have a great
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deal of empirical research available. These aspects help us understand the comparative context in
which the South African party system is studied.
At the Polls

There are two fundamental arguments to the nature of ANC

domination in the polls. First, that the ANC wins elections because of their popular conception as
a liberation movement. The ANC was founded in 1912, but remained an insignificant
organization until it began to fight for black freedom. By the 1940’s and 50’s the party adopted
strong anti-apartheid and anti-racial platform driven by a new militant leadership (Bauer
2001:108). In 1960s the party was banned, launched its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe, and
strengthened its international movement to become the leader in the anti-apartheid movement.
By the 1980’s the banned ANC had created an unofficial alliance with the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and joined the broad United Democratic Front (UDF), a
coalition of parties, civil society groups, churches, and exiled groups against apartheid. While the
importance of the ANC was diminished for a short time during the 1980s, transition brought
assurance that the party and its international figurehead, Nelson Mandela, would become the
post-apartheid leaders. This viewpoint emphasizes the regions history of colonial rule and
imperial violence, that is today reflected in party systems whose only substantive roots in society
are their histories as national movements against oppression (Olaleye 2003:2). The most striking
regional example of this is the dominance of Mugabe’s Zanu-PF in neighboring Zimbabwe. This
despotic leader not only controls his domestic government with an iron fist, but receives little
criticism from other African states unwilling to speak against a great African liberator.
The second understanding at the polls is racial. Some argue that the main political parties
cater only to their traditional supporters (Piombo 2005:460). For example the Inkarta-Freedom
Party continues to emphasize its traditional Zulu base, while the National Party and Democratic
Alliance are seen as white parties. Therefore, an electoral base with these perceptions will not be
able to create a party system devoid of these stereotypes and prejudices. However it is easy to
challenge the assumption that race is a causal factor. Even though there is correlation, there is
little convincing evidence that causation exists. Furthermore, people rarely identify with one
large racial group, but rather overlap with heritage and class (Habib 2001:212). Data published
by the Institute for a Democratic South Africa in 2003 suggests a decrease in party ties being
racially-bound. Both party identification and racial identification have been fluid when
comparing polling data from 1994 to 2003 (IDASA 2003:6). [SEE APPENDIX 5] An
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examination makes it clear that “there is a great potential for opposition parties to win over
significant sections of the electorate… [and] the increase in the numbers of ‘leaners’ and
‘independents’ creates the potential for significant electoral shifts in the future” (Habib
2001:215). The discrepancy in the polling data compared to the election results are not
contradictory, but rather explain the weakness of parliamentary opposition, which this thesis will
discuss as an informal institution shortly. The ANC-voter and racial-voter ties described here can
be therefore diminished imperially and empirically.
By examining ANC dominance at the polls compared to survey data, it becomes clear
that explanations that discount the electoral system, and focus only on the electorate in Africa are
relatively weak and unsupported. We now turn to an essential element of the ANC- its informal
ties to society. Across Africa many authors argue that patronage remains paramount to
explaining electoral and governing success. In the South African context, if patronage is not
paramount, the nature of beneficiaries of ANC rule do not go unnoticed. This can be examined
through the relationship of the ANC and its ruling partners- the South African Communist Party
(SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). This alliance is an
intervening variable that influences the formal rules of the electoral system to increase the
likelihood of single party dominance.
Tripartite Alliance
South Africa is governed by a coalition of the ANC, SACP, and COSATU, a relationship
whose roots are in apartheid resistance of the 1980s. The alliance is an informal institution of the
government that both influences society and at the electoral system level; it is another variable
that is specific to this case, and is part explaining why PR leads to single party dominance.
COSATU began as the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in the early 1980s
to unite workers in a grass-roots party that would be led from the bottom up, rather then the
Leninist top-down model. The federation’s goal was to end apartheid in a manner that would
help all workers. In 1985 the federation joined with the other unions, the ANC and the UDF, and
changed its name to COSATU (Pillay 2006:169-70).
Importance

In the previous section we explained the discrepancy between declining

voter-party-race identification and electoral results as the weakness of the opposition. Adam
Habib and Taylor Rupert argue that the “tripartite alliance has thus become the principal obstacle
to the emergency of a viable opposition and the establishment of truly competitive politics in
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South Africa” (2001:219). Roger Southall and Geoffrey Wood disagree with this assessment,
arguing instead that a split would be dangerous for democracy, and COSATU’s role in the
country would be neutralized as it falls into internal disagreement (1999: 69,79). An examination
of the debate between these authors makes it clear that COSATU retains high ties to society, and
can explain why other parties have been unable to harness great electoral support.
Debate

Habib and Rupert evaluate the role that COSATU has played in

government since transition. The trade union successfully carried out its first goal of being a
strong and meaningful opposition to apartheid, but has fallen short of its long-term goal of
ensuring that workers are well-represented in government (2001:220). Since transition the
movement has retained its radical rhetoric, but diminished its active political role. The greatest
example of this was the abandonment of the original Reconstruction and Development Program
(RDP), and its replacement by the markedly liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) strategy that has been the guiding principle of economy to today. This move, along with
subsequent bashing of COSATU’s position has made it obvious that the tripartite relationship is
no longer based on equality. In 2002 for example, President Mbeki lashed out at leftists within
COSATU telling them to quiet down or leave the organization. In 2004, COSATU pledged its
full support for public sector workers striking for higher wages (Pillay 2006:167).
Roger Southall on the other hand, argues that the ANC-COSATU alliance is essential for
democracy. The organization is essential for internal opposition within the government, ensuring
the ANC does not become too conservative. This is achieved by placing COSATU leaders on 20
percent of their national electoral lists (1999:74-5). However Southall’s view implicitly ignores
the benefits of a multi-party system. His argument that internal ANC rivalry will be sufficient for
democratic consolidation is misguided. While evaluating the ability of the electoral or party
system is beyond the scope of this thesis, there is a preponderance of evidence in the literature
and practice that suggests a multi-party system is more conducive to democracy. (For example
Namibia’s single party dominance has been primarily responsible for the deterioration of
democracy) (Bauer 2001:48).
Society

The degree to which COSATU is tied to the people is essentially

important to understand its influential role realized by the perceptions of the electorate. Some
argue that COSATU is responsible for the high degree of support that the ANC finds at the polls
(Pillay 2006: 168; Nevin 2005:30). This becomes problematic for the development of a multi-
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party system as the African working class represented by COSATU is the only class strong
enough to become a significant base for ANC opposition (Habib 2001:218). This raises the
question of whether the SACP and COSATU were brought into the alliance with promises of
RDP programs, to merely prevent strong independent opposition. COSATU is perfectly
positioned to do this as workers demand and receive consultation with their union structuressomething they think they will not receive from a party (Pillay 2006:180). [SEE APPENDIX 6]
This survey data demonstrates (a) the amount of trust put in trade unions in South Africa over
political parties, and (b) the degree to which the electorate feels their voices will be heard by the
party compared to their trade union. Many authors agree that it is hard to measure the actual
number of votes that the ANC can attribute to COSATU. As of 2002, 27 percent of all workers
in South Africa were unionized (Pillay 2006:175). Furthermore, the creation of the Nedlac
business-government economic forum has given all organized workers and business a semicorporatist formal mechanism to express concerns and influence public policy (176). As business
relationships form with corporatist structures, they will be seen as more important than electoral
mechanisms. In turn, voting the ANC out of office also removes COSATU, the largest union of
trade unions. Therefore, the tripartite alliance has a monopoly on the votes of union members.
Formal Rules

This tripartite relationship not only has an effect on the perceptions

of the electorate, but also is important when understanding formal electoral rules. That is, the
alliance is made possible by the formal institutions of the electoral system. This is possible
because the ANC has much to give to union leaders and politicians by way of their control of
government. Active COSATU leaders have been given prominent government positions in the
1990’s, even though the introduction of GEAR signaled their loss of influence. In many other
African countries, labor movements became opposition parties because they were not receiving
any voice in government. A prime example of this is Zimbabwe’s labor movement, ZCTU.
While originally incorporated into the ruling alliance following independence in 1980, their
increasing independence led to the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change in 2000,
led by Morgan Tsvangirai (Pilay 2006:177). However it is clear that in the South African case,
COSATU leaders are given government positions to retain their alliance- a relationship that
seems to be viable. This relationship is further made possible is by the ability to place the names
of COSATU leaders on national closed lists, thereby guaranteeing labor a voice and
representation in government. Therefore, union politicians are practically guaranteed a formal
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role in government if the ANC wins enough seats at the polls. In turn COSATU is able give their
supporters goods in the way of both legislation and perceived representation. It is clear that the
informal relationship that COSATU enjoys, and the potential strength it could have as an
opposition party, is a key to understanding ANC single party dominance. Without the formal
rules of the electoral system and the ability to ensure union leaders government seats, the ANC
would loose the ability to retain COSATU in the alliance.
Conclusion

The tripartite relationship is significant for explaining ANC single party

dominance because they represent the only other organization with significantly deep but nonracial ties to society. While the amount of literature on the subject is extensive, this thesis does
not predict the future viability of the union, but rather its role as part of the government, and its
potential to develop into opposition. The conclusion is that the alliance leaves the opposition in a
helpless situation. If a primary means for the ANC to communicate and provide benefits for its
supporters is in COSATU, and the ANC can appease union leaders by providing them a
guaranteed voice in government, it is extremely difficult for the opposition to offer incentives or
alternatives.
Nature of Opposition
Traditional theories of the relationship between electoral systems and party systems do
not account for the informal obstacles that opposition parties in South Africa face. Low
campaign finance and weak legislative allegiance are essential to the understanding of why no
party can successfully mobilize enough voters to attain even enough power to challenge the
ANC. These informal institutions are a result of the formal rules of PR. It is important to note
that the opposition is composed of dedicated politicians who fight hard and give their entire lives
to secure a democratic country – their role in government has been effective in securing many of
the liberties and benefits that the country can be thankful for. However, when examining the
effects of the electoral system with the informal institutions of South Africa, it becomes clear
that these parties are undeniably disadvantaged.
Campaign Finance
First, campaign finance is low for the opposition. Across Africa the fact is that limited
state resources do not allow for diverse and competitive parties to attain the appropriate funds to
spread their message (Ranker 2007:13-14). In South Africa specifically, this creates large
swathes of the country that are left unchallenged by the assumed winner as parties strategically
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concentrate their appeals (Olaleye 2003:2). This becomes further problematic as the PR system
has no minimum percentage required to attain a legislative seat, as do many countries who use
this system. Therefore, finance must be distributed amongst many parties, and in theory dilutes
the potential strength of one or two stronger opposition parties.
The issue of finance not only weakens the opposition, but also gives the party in power a
particular incumbent advantage in that it has all state resources at its disposal. Some authors
argue that a party needs a high degree of incumbent resources if that party is to operate
effectively outside government (Rakner 2007:13). The situation is not aided by the fact that
international aid rarely supports political parties, something that might in fact be essential to
democratic transition.
Legislative Allegiance
Second, there is a high degree of weak legislative allegiance in the National Assembly
(Olaleye 2003:2). This does not contradict the argument made earlier that party discipline is
strong and centralized. If a member wants to significantly criticize his party without being
disciplined, he must leave the party to ensure his legislative longevity. This is most obviously
seen through official floor-crossing that was allowed by legislation in 2002. [SEE APPENDIX 2]
The 1996 Constitution contained a clause that allowed for such legislation to be passed by the
National Assembly rather than a more difficult constitutional amendment. The legislation
benefited the ANC when they gained a two-thirds majority by recruiting an additional 14
members in early 2003. This shift immediately threatened the strength and viability of other
parties. However, the legislation was supported by the main opposition (Butler 2004:106).
While floor-crossing was not only immediately strengthened the legislative dominance of
the ANC, side-effects of the legislation are responsible for the maintenance of single party
dominance. It is important to note that “while floor-crossing or political migration, in and of
itself, is not necessarily undesirable in a democracy,” in some party systems it can be detrimental
(Masemola 2007:2). In the South African context, political parties are centrally controlled at the
national level. Government members have little control or say over what goes on at the top
(Olaleye 2003:1). This is clearly a result of the formal closed list system. When combined with
floor-crossing legislation, the result is weakening of smaller parties, and empowerment of the
dominant party for two reasons. First, there is an extreme incentive for individuals to join the
winning party (Walle: 2003:313). Because the ANC controls the executive and the entire cabinet,
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they have an array of posts to give away to woe members of other parties. This accommodation
can be seen as IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi remained in Thabo Mbeki’s cabinet well after
1996 when other parties left (Butler 2004:40). Second, party leaders can force members out of
the party if they challenge command authority (Mattes 2002:26). These powers of the incumbent
serve to weaken the opposition to obviously extreme lows.
ANC Perception
The third aspect of the opposition that is essential to understanding single party
dominance is the perception of the ANC. It is essential to remember that, as explained earlier,
this is not so much because of voter perception, but rather how the ANC defines itself, and
formulates policy. Some argue that this is the most important factor to explain success as most
parties in South Africa actually offer few policy alternatives. According to some authors, there is
“low ideological salience” with more “programmatic homogeneity” because all parties face
similar extenuating circumstances (Walle 2003:303; Habib 2001:215). Some go as far as to argue
that the failure of a vibrant opposition is the fault of opposition leaders rather than the electorate
(Southall 1999;70). While there is validity in the first statement, the lack of a strong opposition
can hardly be attributed to the failure of vibrant and vigorous leaders such as Tony Leon and
Helen Zille. Rather the role that ANC perception plays is in self-evaluation. Essential is the fact
that the ANC continues to define and conduct itself like a liberation movement rather than a
political party. This can be seen as the government does not criticize the actions of Robert
Mugabe’s Zanu-PF in neighboring Zimbabwe, even though the situation is causing enormous
flow of persons and an increase in violence in South Africa. The omnipotent attitude has led
individuals within the ANC to treat the intuitions of government as mechanisms for their own
empowerment (Mattes 2002: 26). Examples of this attitude will become clearer in the next
section.
Conclusion

After examining society, the tripartite alliance, and features of the

opposition it is clear that the opposition must find resonance with the people if they are to be
successful at the polls. Some argue that this can only be done through a charismatic opposition
leader (Solinger 2001:31), others by dismantling the alliance between the ANC, SACP, and
COSATU (Habib 2001:222). Regardless, it is clear that new opposition parties must find a way
to tie themselves to society in meaningful ways. As Lise Rakner and Nicolas Van de Walle put
it, “democracy will thrive in Africa only if political actors develop a set of informal norms… [to]
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legitimize and strengthen the formal rules” (2007:8). Formal electoral rules are combining with
South Africa’s informal social intuitions to create single party dominance. However the picture is
not yet quite complete. Government has evolved in a particular fashion that has even further
aided the longevity of ANC power.
Fluid Evolution of Government
The final piece to understanding the puzzle of single party dominance is the manor in
which South Africa’s government has evolved. Formal constitutional rules have yielded informal
results that are being institutionalized, and increasingly dictate the longevity of ANC dominance.
The components to this include the dominance of the ANC as a party with a way to choose
leadership, the increasing domination of the executive branch, and the federal organization of the
government. Each of these aspects has evolved in a manor that is conducive to the continued
domination of a single party.
Single PARTY Dominant

First, the ANC is party dominant rather than

individual dominant. As the ANC concentrates power, it does so around the position of the
executive and legislative control rather than around an individual. Over the long-term, this means
that domination of the party will outlive the favor of an individual. This distinction has been
made and studied by several authors (Arnade 1999:379). Many other African regimes have been
built on the power of an individual. For example, in Namibia President Nujama single-handedly
created party lists, invaded the DRC, and created an extensive cult or personality. However he
built this power around himself as an individual rather than a party, and therefore ended with his
government (Bauer 2001:37). This occurred often because these “big men” were at the top of
patronage and clientelist networks that offered state resources “in exchange for political
acquiescence” (Boone 1994:131). In the long run classes would be unified into parties based on
the patronage they received.
However South Africa is markedly different than the majority of other African systems.
In this case, a new government took over a previous system of relatively democratic structures
that were already in place. South Africa “did not share the core features of Africa’s neopatrimonial regimes” (Bratton 1997:80). Rather, long-term political tolerance was
institutionalized, and expanding participation to those denied was much simpler than revamping
entire social and political systems (Bauer 2001: 35; Bratton 1997:179). (As a side-note, the
National Party’s single party dominance from 1948 to 1994 was markedly different than that of
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the ANCs. The electoral system was SMP, and the party was able to retain their dominance
through extemporaneous redistricting, or gerrymandering (Lodge 2002).) Because the ANC was
a long-term movement, and its first leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki stepped
down without the crumbling of the party, it is clear that single party dominance centers on formal
and informal institutions. It will not splinter like other single person dominant parties such as the
Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in Zambia while it retains control of the
government (Piombo 2005:450). The evolution and transition of power within the ANC allows it
to retain party system level dominance over an otherwise free and fair electoral system. This is
important to understand the context in which formal and informal institutions are evolving to
give more power the party structures holistically.
Executive Dominance

Formal institutional rules contained within the 1996

Constitution place the executive as the dominant entity in the system of government. The branch
executes laws, and includes the Cabinet, senior members of the public service known as the
Directors General, the Treasury, and the security services. While across the world in general the
executive branch has become more powerful, it is through this branch that the ANC has
concentrated its power most effectively (Butler 2004:93). Formally, the president appoints all
Cabinet ministers, who in turn control about a million public servants within the 29 departments.
The majority of disputes within ministries are handled internally, with a very few controversial
ones reaching the cabinet-level. Informally, the president’s power is far greater. In 1999 Mbeki
created policy coordination unit to monitor the lower-level decisions of the bureaucracy, and
extend executive control over all decision-making. Some even argue that he his close position
with the Government Communications and Information Service allows him to manipulate the
media (Butler 2004:94). By law, it is obvious that the position of the president is dominant.
The executive has also become more powerful over time, especially in comparison to the
legislature. It is clear that many legislatures in Africa only weakly check executive power, and
South Africa is no exception (Ranker 2007:11). Today some argue that “parliament is a bloated
and largely reactive policy-influencing legislature on the Westminster model, but with strict
party discipline reinforced by a party-list proportional system permitting easy ‘redeployment’ of
disloyal members” (Butler 2004:118). Many authors would agree with this statement (Bauer
2001; Bratton 2007; Lijphart1985; Rakner 2007). The essential reason that the power of the
executive has increased in relation to the legislature is the effect of the closed-list electoral
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system. Because the executive is also the head of the party who controls which candidates can be
put up on electoral ballots, the ability of members of parliament to appose the president is nonexistent. The most poignant example of the increasing executive dominance was the 1999 29.9
billion rand Arms Deal involving the executive. While the details of the scandal are less
important, the subsequent reaction of the legislature to check the president was to ignore it. The
National Assembly Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), which was headed by the
opposition, used the Special Investigation Unit to examine the case. While ANC members passed
a resolution supporting the actions of the Unit, they de facto distanced themselves to curry
presidential favor (Mattes 2002:27). This incident demonstrated the power the executive
currently holds over the institution that is supposed to function as a check on abuse. The only
branch that remained relatively independent was the judiciary, which was well insulated form
party manipulation (Butler 2004:122). However the traditional structure and white domination on
the bench makes the perceptions of this institution negative, and hurts its ability to check the
executive regardless of its formal role. This works to ANC institutional dominance.
The reaction of members within the legislature was a result of formal electoral
institutions. The closed-list nature of the electoral system puts a member’s future in the hands of
the command structure of power within the party. Therefore, if a member of parliament were to
challenge the executive, he would be removed from the party electoral list during the next round
of elections. Likewise, if the president were being challenged by a member of the opposition, he
could easily woo said member to his party during the next period of floor-crossing. During
transition negotiations, the ANC explicitly rejected the full Westminster PR system by
demanding that the cabinet was to be controlled totally by the ruling party (even though the GNU
did split cabinet portfolios until 1996 (Ottaway 1993:100). In most other countries, governments
are created through coalition, and the power of government is rarely given such autonomous
control.
Another aspect of executive dominance is the incumbency advantage. Nicolas van de
Walle argues that in Africa generally, whichever party “was able to control the chief executive’s
office, and attain a winning legislative majority following the first election, was then able to
consolidate power” (2003:301). The past several paragraphs have focused on more formal
concentration of power. However, it is important to note that in Africa especially, a strong
executive means a stronger incumbency advantage (Rakner 2007:13). This can be attributed to
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the high visibility that the dominant party receives compared to less powerful and under-funded
parties. The party in control of the executive, and the entire cabinet and bureaucracy has vast
pool of resources to reach a geographically broad electorate. This informal institution is
especially important in Africa where financing is not enormous, and must be spread across a
large number of parties.
Federalism

The final area in which informal institutions of South Africa challenge the

traditional conception of formal institutions is the separation of powers between the national and
provincial governments. Donald Horowitz argues that “the nexus between electoral rules and the
level on which parties compete” are an important yet underdeveloped area (Piombo 2005:448).
While literature specific to this case is scarce, it is clear that the evolution of relations between
the entities has concentrated the power of the federal executive and the ANC. Formally, the
constitution calls for “concurrent powers” and “co-operative governance,” but in reality the state
is unitary. The provinces can neither raise revenue nor legislate significantly (Butler 2004:118).
Jessica Piombo argues that federal systems empower local groups, and small regional parties,
while unitary systems minimize the utility of local groups and elections, and put power in the
national executive (2005:453). For South Africa, a discussion of federalism is important because
it demonstrates how the de jura constitutional requirement of concurrent powers has been diluted
to de facto national dominance. During negotiations for example, the ANC initially rejected
federalism, but subsequently capitulated to opposition groups. This suggests that the party
leadership prefers a strong national government in practice. The centralization around the
national government is similar to the tight party control exercised through closed electoral lists.
Federalism is important because the ANC has weakened the policy-making ability of the
provinces, and therefore the ability for opposition parties to build stronger regional bases from
which to build power nationally. While a federal or unitary state is a formal institution when it is
written down, South Africa is informally similar to a unitary state because of the weakness of the
provincial assemblies. Therefore, when PR meets what in practice is a unitary state, a forum for
opposition is removed.
An examination of the evolution of government through ANC party dominance,
executive concentration, and federalism reveals that informal institutions and norms specific to
the South African case are essential to understand why formal institutions and rules do not by
themselves explain single party dominance.
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IV. Possible Alternative Systems
There is a vast amount of literature that explore possible alternative electoral and
government systems that are different than the system South Africa actually uses today. While
some were published both before transition as suggestions, many since transition from apartheid
have studied the “what ifs.” Because this thesis examines the type of electoral system as its
independent variable, it is worth mentioning some of the predicted results had other systems
been used in this case. We will briefly examine different PR systems used, plurality, the
alternative vote, and conclude with real consociationalism.
PR

Many authors agreed, both before and after transition, that PR was the best system

to successfully deal with the challenges faced by the country. Arend Lijphart argues that PR
would be the best system to use as it has the best record when evaluating representation, voter
participation, and controlling economic factors such as unemployment (Reynolds 1996:87).
However there are many different ways variables when running PR. For example, South Africa
uses the droop quota (that is votes/seats+1) to translate votes into seats, and uses one national
district to elect half the members of the National Assembly (so district magnitude is 200).
Andrew Reynolds hypothetically runs the election results in several different ways. (He
explicitly assumes that people would have voted the same way if different electoral system had
been used, thereby diminishing the importance of strategic voting.) If only provincial lists had
been used, the ANC would have more votes from the smallest parties, while the votes received
by the second and third most represented would remain the same. [SEE APPENDIX 7] In his
examination, the system of PR used in South Africa has been the most effective in diminishing
the numerical strength of the ANC in the National Assembly. As this thesis has made clear, it is
not just numerical dominance in the legislature that causes single party dominance.
SMP

In 1996 Andrew Reynolds examined the possible consequences of using

the plurality, (here called SMP) for the South African National Assembly. He argues that SMP
system would have caused “racially exclusive and geographically parochial governments.
Parties, who receive not even a minimal voice in government, might turn to violence and extragovernmental means in order to make their voices heard. If the 1994 election were re-run using
the plurality system, the Freedom Front, DP, PAC, and African Christian Democrats would be
completely shut out of the system. [SEE APPENDIX 7] Guy Lardeyret on the other hand argues
that a plurality and two-party system would be best because it would force large ethnic parties to
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campaign and legislate on non-ethnic platforms (Reynolds 1996:87). However, as this thesis
demonstrates, a certain electoral system will not always dictate a concrete party system, even
when faced with the informal institutions that are identified here. While Lardeyret’s argument of
the benefits of a two-party system is well-taken, it is doubtful that a two-party system would
have evolved. Furthermore, the vast amount of literature on the effects of PR versus SMP in
mitigating ethnic and social violence suggests that a plurality system would not have addressed
deep-rooted social problems, let alone the basic foundations of a two-party system. However, an
evaluation of the utility in mitigating ethnic or social conflict is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Alternative Vote

Many authors argue that only a mixed or special system

will work. Donald Horowitz for example argues that only the alternative vote system will work
when single member districts in the plurality system are modified to reallocate voters second,
third, and subsequent choices for until a candidate receives a majority (Reynolds 1996:87). This
would essentially mitigate the effects of the closed list system, in the long run making a member
of government more accountable to the people and his constituency rather than the concentrated
power hierarchy. While this would mitigate an important aspect of the independent variable in
this thesis (the closed list,) Reynolds argues without a closed list, parties would be unable to
create parties with broad appeal, one of the most important aspects in a post-conflict society.
(1996:92). A closed list allows parties to insert minority candidates, such as women, who would
be less likely to receive positions if left entirely to the voter. While there seems to be an
advantage in using the alternative vote system for the party system, it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to determine whether the utility of PR to mitigate social conflict outweighs the problems it
causes of the party system. However the isolation of these informal variables will make altering
the system for the future far clearer.
Consociationalism

In 1985 Arend Lijphart continued his exploration of

consociationalism by arguing that it would be the best way for a peaceful transition in South
Africa, and the only way to sustain democracy over the long-run. He argued that the only way
that South Africa would be able to successfully move from the violence of apartheid through a
peaceful transition would be through consociational democracy. Consociationalism is an elitebased system of governance that works when society is divided into distinct social groups with
limited interaction. At the national level, grand coalitions form because each group is willing to
compromise to avoid conflict. Peace made at the top is supposed to trickle down to society
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(1985:133). This is the current arrangement of government in Belgium, and to a certain extent
Netherlands. In her examination of transition negotiations, Marina Ottaway reports that the ANC
“equated democracy with majority rule, no with consociationalism, rejecting proportional
representation in the executive” (1993:100). However, Andrew Reynolds argues, in 1996, that
South Africa has met the basic criteria for Lijphart’s consociationalism by citing Article 88 of
the Interim Constitution which gives all parties with more than five percent of the National
Assembly a share of cabinet portfolios. Initially, members were included in the cabinet: the NP
won six of 27 portfolios and the IFP had three (Reynolds 1996:90). However, under Section 91
of the current 1996 Constitution, the president has full power of appointment and dismissal
(South African Constitution 1996). Therefore, while PR is used in the legislature, the presidency
is, as Ottaway puts it, run by ANC “majority rule.” If Lijphart’s consociationalism had been
adopted in the new constitution, the fluid evolution of government towards the executive would
surely be very different. But again, while the party system would be different, it is beyond the
scope of this thesis to determine the socially mitigating benefits of a strong executive.
Federalism

It is worth briefly mentioning the possible effects of a true federal system

applied to South Africa, as was constitutionally mandated. Some authors argue that the weak
federal structures have made parties to campaign with broad national appeals rather than divisive
regional rhetoric (Piombo 2005:449). While this may have been important for the first years of
transition, a federal system more in line with Germany would diminish ANC power within the
central government. This should be a possible alternative researched by the IEC if they are
commissioned to complete future studies and recommendations for the South African system.
Conclusion

An examination of the possible alternative methods of possible

electoral systems that South Africa could have used reveals the hypothetical effects of the
various electoral rules and institutions on the party system are far from concrete. The pretransition literature on possible systems concentrates on what type of electoral system will
mitigate and minimize ethnic conflict, and maintain the country’s relative peace. It is an area that
this thesis mostly ignores. While single party dominance is bad for democracy in the long run,
perhaps a system that produced dominance is the only one that would have successfully
mitigated social conflict. However this section has examined some of the possible alternatives
that need exploration if South Africa is to mitigate the effect of informal institutions on the
electoral system.
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V. Conclusions
The most striking aspect of the South African transition from more than fifty years of
apartheid to mostly democratic system is that it happened at all. While there was a dramatic rise
in violence during the early nineties, it was regionally limited, and did not erupt into a national
civil war. There is no doubt that the four years of intense negotiation between the National Party
(NP), the African National Congress (ANC), and all other stakeholders was not an easy process.
By 1993 an interim constitution had been written, with the election of an interim government the
following year. The 1999 and 2004 elections both confirmed the nation’s commitment to
democracy, and further instilled the dominance of the ANC.
While some do not find single party dominance problematic, a comparative study
suggests that an unopposed party will continue to concentrate its hold on power. Therefore, this
thesis has explained the current party system as a result of the specific way the electoral system
interacts with informal institutions. That is, the way that proportional representation (PR) rules,
including the closed list and extreme proportionality, have met society, the tripartite alliance, and
the fluid evolution of government to produce single party dominance. To alter this situation, a
thorough examination of what has been presented here is necessary.
This thesis has also added to the literature of comparative politics by contributing to our
understanding of the relationship between electoral system and party systems. Those who
attempt to implement new systems need to be aware of the possible outside factors that can
influence the party system. One can not assume that PR will always lead to a truly multi-party
system, or that a single member plurality (SMP) system will lead to a true two-party system until
informal influences are properly studied.
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APPENDIX 2: Floor Crossing: change of seats during 2005 floor crossing period
2006. “South Africa: Floor-crossing outcome 2005.” EISA. (February).
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Seats 2004
(election)

Party

Seats 2005 (floorcrossing)

Gain Loss

Net

African National Congress

279

293

14

0

14

Democratic Alliance

50

47

2

5

-3

Inkatha Freedom Party

28

23

0

5

-5

United Democratic
Movement

9

6

0

3

-3

Independent Democrats

7

5

0

2

-2

New National Party

7

0

0

7

-7

African Christian
Democratic Party

7

4

0

3

-3

Freedom Front +

4

4

0

0

0

United Christian
Democratic Party

3

3

0

0

0

Pan Africanist Congress of
Azania

3

3

0

0

0

Minority Front

2

2

0

0

0

Azanian People's
Organization

1

1

0

0

0

National Democratic
Convention

0

4

4

0

4

United Independent Front

0

2

2

0

2

Federation of Democrats

0

1

1

0

1

United Party of South
Africa

0

1

1

0

1

Progressive Independent
Movement

0

1

1

0

1

(Total)

(400)

(400)

(25)

(25)

(0)
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APPENDIX 3: High degree of correspondence between seat percentages and vote percentages in
the 2004 election
Lijphart, Arend. 1995. “The South African Electoral System: Unusual Features and Prospects for Reform” from
NSF research project: Electoral Laws, Electoral Lists and Campaigning in the First Non-Racial South
African Elections. <http://www.fairvote.org/?page=554>

Party
ANC
NP
IFP
FF
DP
PAC
ACDP

o
62.65
20.9
10.54
2.17
1.73
1.25
.45

Votes

o
63.00
20.50
10.75
2.25
1.75
1.25
.50

Seats

note: Furthermore, the Loosemore-Hanby index shows that the degree of “over-represnted
parties” is .82- lower than all other 384 other elections examined by Lijphart.
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APPENDIX 4: Voter party perception 1994 to 1999
Habib, Adam. Rupert Taylor. 2001. “Political Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in Post-Apartheid South
Africa.” Democratization, 8.1: 207-226. Charts on Pgs 213-14. Adopted from IDASA data.
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APPENDIX 5: Decrease in racially-based party support from 1994 to 2002
Africa, Cherrel. Robert Mattes. Collette Herzenberg. Lerato Banda. 2003. “Political Party Support in South Africa:
Trends Since 1994.” IDASA Afrobarometer, 6. Pgs 3-7
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APPENDIX 6: Perception polls of COSATU members
Pillay, Devan. 2006. “Cosatu, alliances and working-class politics.” In Trade Unions and Democracy, ed. Sakhela
Buhlungu, 167-190. Cape Town: HSRC Press. Pgs 180 and 181.

A. Showing that workers trust trade unions to a higher degree than political parties

B. Showing that workers most likely response to government failure is to their trade union

APPENDIX 7: Re-running the 1994 South African national elections under alternative systems
Reynods, Andrew. 1999. Electoral Systems and Democracatizaiton in Southern Africa. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. Pg 223.
Party

Vote
(%)

Plurality
(Seats)

Vote
(%)

ANC
NP
IFP
FF
DP
PAC
ACDP
Total
I.D.

62.65
20.39
10.54
2.17
1.73
1.25
0.45
100

283
68
49
0
0
0
0
400
6.7

71
17
12
0
0
0
0
100

SMD
AV
(Seats)
277
70
53
0
0
0
0
400
5.9

Vote
(%)
69
17
13
0
0
0
0
100

MMD
AV
(Seats)
282
63
55
0
0
0
0
400
7.2

Vote
(%)
71
16
14
0
0
0
0
100

Prov.
PR
(Seats)
255
82
43
8
7
5
0
400
0.8

Vote
(%)
64
20
11
2
2
1
0
100

Nat.
List
PR
252
82
43
9
7
5
2
400
0.3

Vote
(%)
63
20
11
2
2
1
0.5
100

